It has been four years since the extraordinary event of 8 November 2016. Much has been written and, indeed, more needs to be said about the medium- and long-term effects of the decision to demonetise about 86% of the currency in circulation. The scale of this policy decision and the extended period over which currency shortages persisted has no parallel in India’s economic history, and perhaps of the world in recent time. More than two years later, a report by the Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE) indicates that the phenomenon of declining labour force participation rates shows a yearly declining trend in the post-November 2016 period. The head of the CMIE said,
In every month of 2018 and in the months of 2019 so far, the ratio has always been lower than it was in the corresponding month of the previous year. This was also the case in 2017. But, that could be attributed to demonetisation. The continued y-o-y fall in the labour participation rate even in 2018 and 2019 indicates a deeper or a more sustained problem ailing India’s labour markets. (Business Today 2019)
What is more, the CMIE data shows that:
… the unemployment rate rose to 7.2% in February 2019, the worst in 28 months. Meanwhile, the labour force is down 25.7 million since September 2016 and the number of employed persons has declined by 18.3 million in the same period. (Business Today 2019)
While demonetisation cannot be held solely responsible, and other factors have confounded the analysis of its medium-term effects, 8 November 2016 does become a defining moment in the trend analysis. While the gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates may not tell the full story of the impact on the informal sector, the employment data may continue to bear the marks of a downturn for the medium term at least. Employment is crucial to sustainable financial inclusion. The severe contraction of the economy in the COVID-19 scenario may be attributed in measure to its fragility in the post-demonetisation years (Scroll 2020).
Focus of the Present Study
The focus of the study relates to two events; the first was the sudden announcement of demonetisation by the Prime Minister on 8 November 2016. Eighty-six percent of currency in circulation was affected. In that famous televised address, the Prime Minister said, and I quote from the second paragraph of the text,
In this effort for development, our motto has been “Sab Ka Saath Sab Ka Vikas”: We are with all citizens and for development of all citizens. This Government is dedicated to the poor. It will remain dedicated to them. In our fight against poverty, our main thrust has been to empower the poor, and make them active participants in the benefits of economic progress. (Business Standard 2017)
He listed various schemes, such as the Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana, the Jan Suraksha Yojana, the Pradhan Mantri Micro Units Development and Refinance Agency (MUDRA) Yojana for small enterprises, the Stand-up India programme for Dalits, Adivasis and women, the Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana for gas connections in the homes of the poor, the Pradhan Mantri Fasal Bima Yojana, Pradhan Mantri Krishi Sinchai Yojana, etc, and said that these were all reflections of the government’s approach of fighting poverty. According to him, in the past decades, the spectre of corruption and black money had grown and had weakened the effort to eradicate poverty (Business Standard 2017).
The second, more significant event was the decision of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) (and the government, one presumes) to reduce the currency in circulation, and keep it below its pre-November 2016 levels, thereby reducing the availability and use of cash. As per the RBI, the currency in circulation eight months after demonetisation (on 28 July 2017), stood reduced from 12% to 9% of GDP. This typically ranges between 5% and 8% of GDP in developed nations (Nayak 2017). Swift restoration of cash in circulation was not on the agenda. The process was slow. Compared to the pre-demonetisation level, the cash in market was 70% after four months and 82.6% after six months (Hindu 2017). It became 99% only in late February 2018, 15 months later. As a percentage of GDP, the currency in circulation had fallen by about 1% to 10.48%, two years after demonetisation.
There is some reason to consider the second event (delayed or slow restoration of cash in market) seriously in light of the first, that is, the demonetisation (in the name of empowerment of the poor). It is not very clear what the logic of that second policy decision was. It might as well be that banks were stuck with too much liquidity and credit offtake had not yet picked up, and there was no requirement to circulate more currency, or it might be a planned currency shortage to push digital transactions. The media pointed to the role of the lobbies of international financial and technology companies seeking lucrative markets in India, since legislations in the US post 2008 had reduced their profits. Their campaign was known as the “Global War on Cash.”
The idea of forced digitalization of the Indian economy by massive demonetisation was probably a part of this push. The network of international financial technology (fintech) corporations, payment sector organisation like the credit/debit card and mobile payment companies earn their revenue from the charges levied on digital transactions. As a response to the Dodd-Frank and Durbin initiatives [legislations to control profits], the US payments industry, fintech companies, their philanthropic associates and some development agencies of the US government came together and established an organisation called Better than Cash Alliance (BTCA) in 2012. Members of the BTCA include Citi Foundation, Master Card, Visa Foundation, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Ford Foundation, Omidyar Network and USAID [United States Agency for International Development]. Its stated objective is to accelerate the transition from cash to digital payments globally. (Chavan 2017)
The Government of India, through the Ministry of Finance, formally joined the BTCA in September 2015 (Chavan 2017). Barely a month after demonetisation, the Harvard Business Review published a paper that begins by saying “India is in the throes of an unprecedented social experiment in enforced digital disruption (italics mine), and the world has much to learn from it” (Chakravorti 2016). Since then, the International Monetary Fund has also begun to make recommendations on how countries can manage the transition effectively (Kireyev 2017). Interestingly, in relation to its traditional developmental role of inclusion, the Annual Report of the RBI dated 30 August 2017 mentioned digitalisation, saying,
The role of the Reserve Bank in the area of financial inclusion involves developing policies towards ensuring the availability of banking services at affordable costs for those vulnerable sections of society who have hitherto been left outside the scope of formal financial services due to factors such as illiteracy, lack of banking infrastructure, difficulty in physical access to such services in far flung areas and perceived lack of credit worthiness. Recognizing that financial illiteracy is a major impediment to the diffusion of financial inclusion, the Reserve Bank focused on the dissemination of simple messages introducing people to the benefits of active savings, prudent borrowing practices, financial planning as well as unravelling the world of digital transactions for them. Consumer protection also forms an important aspect of these messages, which are also issued in vernacular language. (Reserve Bank of India 2017)
Given the long-term and grave tasks of poverty alleviation and financial inclusion, how was a sudden policy decision aimed at digitalisation by reducing in-circulation currency justified? How was it planned in the context of recognised large-scale financial illiteracy and poor infrastructure for internet connectivity? Non-cash transactions are typically more expensive than cash ones. This had consequences for the sub-sector of the informal economy that was unable to go digital due to the lack of infrastructure, accessibility of banks or unaffordability of overhead costs required to maintain bank accounts, and costly and uncertain internet connectivity.
According to the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India, in 2016, 28.77% of the population had an internet subscription, with 62% in urban areas and only 13.6% in rural areas. All India telephone density was 84%, 156% for urban areas and 51% for rural areas (Telecom Regulatory Authority of India 2016). The majority used internet only on ordinary mobiles and not on smartphones. Although a shift to smartphones is occurring now (the share of mobile users with a smartphone was about 28% in 2018), the forced, unplanned shift in payment modes would have produced disruptions and unintended consequences. For example, one can rationally assume that low-income groups everywhere, but particularly rural folk, would form the bulk of those who were excluded from digital transactions. This survey and its results, viewed from hindsight, indicate some of the possible effects of both events.
Method and Population Profile
Two hundred and seventy-six people were surveyed in 11 wards of Mumbai and 17 wards of Pune, two of the largest cities in the more developed, western state of Maharashtra. The surveyed were mostly women, fruit, vegetable, and food vendors, and garment, incense sticks, bag, soap and phenol makers, employed in different petty trades and manufacturing. Fieldwork began five months after the note ban, among those employed in marketplaces in Pune, and the women in self-help groups (SHGs) in Mumbai. The constructive impact of the Swarna Jayanti Shahari Rozgar Yojana (SJSRY) (now the National Urban Livelihood Mission), a livelihood-oriented poverty alleviation and financial inclusion programme has been discussed extensively (Kalhan 2019). The policy is based on thrift, SHG-bank linkage, credit, skill training and group-based livelihoods. The sample thus has two subcategories.
In Pune, the participants were chosen and identified on a random basis by interviewers trained to identify the “female marginal” players in marketplaces and structured questionnaires were administered (Kalhan 2018). In Mumbai, women were identified randomly from among the listed SHGs (kept by the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation) across various wards. These women too represent the tiny sector; they are often marginal producers and sellers in an extremely competitive marketplace. The impact on Pune and Mumbai subsets was analysed separately and together. These representatives of the tiny and informal sector transact regularly and often entirely in what is referred to as the “cash economy” of urban India.
The average age of the sample was 42 years, and 149 women from Mumbai and 106 women (and 21 men) from Pune participated. The combined data of Mumbai and Pune are presented in the tables in Appendix A (p 45), of Pune individually in Appendix B (p 46) and of Mumbai individually in Appendix C (p 46). The majority of participants (80%) had saffron ration cards, that is, above poverty line (APL) cards.1 An 8% minority of the sample had yellow ration cards and was therefore classified as below poverty line (BPL). Almost all (92%) had acquired an Aadhaar card (Appendix Table 3A). The majority used public services like ration shops (68%), schools (63%) and hospitals (65%) (in India, that is a supplementary indicator of low socio-economic status). The bulk (66%) were educated only up to Class 8 (Appendix Table 1A).
Twenty-three per cent were not employed and 13% worked when possible, that is, they were not regularly employed. Only 18% had regular wage employment. Nearly 31.5% of the sample was regularly self-employed or juggling self-employment and wage work; this group was likely to be to be most adversely impacted by currency shortages (Appendix Table 2A). The average income of the respondents was `14,274 per month in the three months preceding demonetisation; their family incomes were not much higher, at `24,416 per month. Hence, they fell in the category of no income tax liability. A distribution by their incomes is given in Appendix Tables 4A and 5A.
The State of Financial Inclusion
Participation: Out of the total participants, 55% had a bank account by 2013; and by April 2017, only 2.5% did not have one. Based on memory and recall, the earliest account opening year in the sample is 1978 and progress in account opening is slow but steady after 2000, as the frequency of opening first bank accounts climbed, the trend accelerated further after 2010, to reach its peak in 2015–16 (Appendix Table 6A). The majority had one, followed by two or more accounts in the family (Appendix Table 7A). The majority (76%) had their accounts in public sector banks, with Bank of Maharashtra being the local favourite, followed by assorted private and cooperative banks. About 30% opened a Jan Dhan account after August 2014, presumably as hopeful participants of a scheme, which would bring benefits of direct cash transfers. As for the other financial schemes like insurance, contributory pension, etc, launched before and after 2014, respondents showed little recognition even in April–May 2017.
The Jan Dhan scheme had the following avowed objectives: universal access to banking facilities, improved financial literacy via financial literacy centres, pension facility for the unorganised sector (Swavalamban), micro-insurance facility, access to credit, credit guarantee fund, overdraft facility (up to `5,000 after six months of satisfactory credit history) and RuPay debit card facility. So far, the main subsidy deposits in the Jan Dhan accounts have been the cooking gas/liquified petroleum gas subsidy (51%), and only 7.5% said they received pension, subsidy or scholarships in any bank account directly (Appendix Table 8A). The most favoured manner of financial saving was still the self-help and thrift groups called bachat gat in Mumbai, and recurring bank deposits, followed by life insurance (such as the policies provided by the Life Insurance Corporation [LIC] of India). Women in Pune also wanted to be organised in bachat gats.
As for the other financial schemes like insurance, contributory pension, etc, launched before and after 2014, the respondents showed little recognition in April–May 2017 (Appendix Table 9A). For example, for an old scheme like the Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY), only 3.6% of the sample said they had invested in it; 1.4% had opted for the Atal Pension Yojana, and the number is slightly higher for the new accident (5%) and life insurance (4%) schemes. Participants showed little enthusiasm for these schemes, but when asked what kind of financial services they needed the most now, ironically, 17% said pension and 21% said “savings accounts,” and health insurance (9%) was followed by the 4% who said “loans” (Appendix Table 10A). The appetite for credit seemed extremely low.
The sense from the field is that they had not heard of these schemes yet, and did not have enough or a regular income to keep up a desired saving rate, and the situation deteriorated after 8 November. Only 13% said that their savings in all the above schemes had increased in the post-demonetisation three-month period preceding the survey, that is, January–March 2017. This happened even though the banks give them interest on their saving accounts. According to government data, in May 2019, the total balance in these “basic” bank accounts stood at `99,752 crore, with 35.5 crore beneficiaries, but the average balance in most Jan Dhan accounts hovered at around `2,000, only `332 higher than 2016. These accounts are also demonstrating certain strange volatility in the growth trajectory but around elections (Sridhar 2019). One does not know yet what the impact of the sudden but prolonged Covid-19-led lockdown will be on this segment.
Credit: When asked if they had taken a bank loan in 2015–16 prior to demonetisation, 12% of the respondents said they had, and the average value of the loan was less than `2 lakh ($2,857 approximately at present rates). Business loans (8% of the sample or 66% of the loan takers) were the leading type according to purpose, followed by education and health-related loans. However, a slightly greater percentage (13.4%) had taken non-bank loans in that year, mainly from their SHGs (most common in Mumbai); the rest from microfinance companies (more common in Pune) and moneylenders. The reported purpose was, in the order of significance: business, education, health, marriage and paying back previous loans. Personal and consumption loans also figured. The average non-bank loan amount was smaller. But when asked what kind of financial service they needed now (Appendix Table 10A), only 4% wanted a loan, the rest were interested in pension, health insurance and accident insurance (in the order of preference). So, compared to the 25% who had taken loans in 2015–16 prior to demonetisation, the demand for credit seems to have fallen off sharply. The reason will become clearer.
Effect of Currency Shortage
For the self-employed or wage-employed in petty trade, the impact on business and sales turnover was serious. Fifty-two percent of the respondents said that sales fell after demonetisation; close to 2% described it as less than or equal to 100% (Appendix Table 11A). About 8% reported that a family member lost his/her job and 6% said that someone in the neighbourhood was rendered unemployed. Thirty-seven percent said that their own income in the last three months had fallen, and an equally high 34% said that the family income had fallen (Appendix Table 12A).
Before 8 November, average total bank savings (per respondent) were estimated at `16,823. Thirty percent reported that their savings in banks had fallen, 24% had trouble paying school and college fees, and 25% had trouble with hospital and other family bills. The estimated average total current savings (April–May 2017) were `6,627 (Appendix Tables 13A and 14A), having come down by 60%. Many estimated a reduction in the consumption of food and medicines. About one-third of the interviewees seemed to have had an extremely hard time for various reasons, not including the time spent in ATM lines. About 13% started using digital transactions (mostly in Mumbai) and in April–May 2017, in all, 15% used digital transactions if necessary.
In open-ended answers, respondents spoke of their problems from rotting fruits and vegetables in the days immediately after demonetisation, having to sell on credit, having to borrow to pay back loans, not being able to pay for cooking gas, hospital bills, no change for `2,000 notes, no money for marriage expenses, and being stranded in the village, where the situation was much worse, and so on. Many of these issues have been discussed in the public realm. But there was the occasional comment about the frenzy created earlier around banks with Jan Dhan and then demonetisation, the loss of faith in banks, depression in business, incomes, savings, uncertainty about the future, and much talk of banks becoming untrustworthy and digital money creating too much of confusion and fraud. These are non-trivial consequences.
Distress in Mumbai versus Pune
The Mumbai sample spread over 11 wards consists entirely of women, often housewives and home-based workers, and all were members of SHGs/bachat gats sponsored by the old poverty alleviation and financial inclusion policy called SJSRY. Details regarding the socio-economic, educational and employment status of Mumbai participants can be found in Appendix Tables 1C, 2C and 3C. The Pune sample, spread over 17 wards, consists of women who are mainly self-employed. If the data are separated and compared, the inferences are noteworthy. In Mumbai, 52% had their own bank accounts before 2014, but a majority would have had group accounts well before that. Their average estimated monthly income before November 2016 was `8,805, excluding the unemployed and no responses (Appendix Tables 4C and 5C). This and family income are much lower than the same estimate for Pune sample.
Table 1 highlights the aspects of financial inclusion. In the Mumbai group too, there was a sharp increase in the number of bank accounts opened after 2014, under the Jan Dhan Yojana. Their estimated average bank savings before November 2016 were also somewhat lower at `12,363. Even though 36% opened a Jan Dhan account (greater than the Pune sample), their most preferred saving instrument was bachat gats, followed by recurring bank accounts. Like the Pune sample, they displayed little interest in the new insurance and pension schemes. Only 5% had invested in the Pradhan Mantri Suraksha Bima Yojana and 4% had invested in the Pradhan Mantri Jeevan Jyoti Bima Yojana. However, 31% said their savings in their individual bank accounts and new schemes stayed about the same, and had not increased in the post-demonetisation three months, but nor had they decreased. Perhaps because their individual exposure to market-based livelihood was limited, only 17% reported a fall in sales mostly up to half.
Four percent reported that a family member had lost a job and 5% reported a job loss in the neighbourhood. Only 8% experienced a decline in their own income and 4% in their family income. For 20% participants, savings in banks stayed the same and only for 13% did it decrease. Only 15% had trouble paying school and college fees and 14% had problems with hospital and wedding expenses. Thirteen percent shifted to digital payments and 18% say they use it even now. These are all lower distress percentages than Pune. In the Mumbai sample, 13% had taken a bank loan and 11% had taken a non-bank (bachat gat) loan but they had low exposure (4%) to microfinance companies and moneylenders. Eighty-two percent would prefer to take loans from banks even in the future. The groups seemed to have cushioned the currency shortages and escaped the worst forms of adversity in the post-demonetisation period.
In the Pune sample, the average age of respondents is 46 years, 70% are saffron card holders and 12% are BPL yellow card holders (Table 1B). Forty-one percent are illiterate, and hence, a total of 63% have less than primary schooling (Table 2B). Six percent did not have a bank account and 23% opened a Jan Dhan account. They may seem to have lower socio-economic status, but their estimated average incomes and savings are higher than the Mumbai group (Table 4B). The group includes small shopkeepers and vendors, 66% of who have licences to operate in the market. Only 8% are unemployed, and together with those who are employed when possible, they constitute a smaller percentage of 15% when compared to Mumbai (Table 3B).
This is because the sample was collected in and around marketplaces in Pune targeting the marginal agents and 56% of them are broadly in the self-employed category vendors of fruits, vegetables, flowers, lemons, garlic, fish, jewellery, kulfi, pani-puri (a popular street food), vendors of toys, spices, shoes, plastic products, small grain merchants, and so on, and a minority were domestic or wage workers. Their average monthly estimated income was `16,249 prior to November 2016. Monthly income of a vast majority among them, 89%, was `20,000 or less, and they had an average estimated family income of `25,671 per month. Their average bank savings were `41,902 prior to demonetisation. So, they are broadly in the same slab, that is, APL but below the minimum income tax slab.
Probably because they were all located and connected with the market, 92% of them responded to the question “Did sales fall after 8 November?” with a yes. Four percent said the drop was nearly 100%, 31% said about 75%, and 36% reported a 50% drop in sales. Both incomes and savings fell. This happened in the context that 6% had taken bank loans and 12.6% had non-bank loans (from bachat gats and microfinance companies) mainly for business. Thereafter, 71% reported a decrease in their income in the three months following November. Fifty percent said that their savings had declined. At the time of the interview, the majority could not/did not respond accurately to the question of how much their incomes and savings had dropped off.
But from the minority who did respond, the average income was estimated at `13, 097 and the average saving was `16,589; both had declined. It appeared that the participants had run down their savings to cope with falling sales and income, because average bank savings were `41,902 before November 2016 and are currently estimated at `16,589. Twelve percent said that someone in their family and 8% said someone in the neighbourhood lost their job. More than a third of them had troubles paying either for school and college fees or hospital bills and wedding expenses. Even though the sample is highly exposed to the market, only 14% could shift to digital payments and the proportion dropped soon after. Table 2 lists the reported impact of currency shortage.
Conclusions
Data analysis shows that the subjects of this survey are similar, in that, they are largely above the official poverty line but below the income tax-paying slab. There was a distinct decline in their demand, sales, income, and bank savings in the months following 8 November 2016. These were the consequences of currency shortages, and these were likely to remain unless a major boost was received at the lower end of the employment-income strata, which did not materialise.
For the self-employed, the demand for credit shrank. Subsequent and enduring currency shortage aggravated the decline. However, there were differences in the intensity of impact; the Mumbai sample was less severely affected because they were organised in groups, linked to banks and credit before demonetisation. Compared to the 25% who had taken loans in 2015–16 prior to demonetisation, the demand for credit seems to have fallen off sharply. Only 4% wanted a loan in April–May 2017. The Pune sample had a higher average income and employment level. But it appears that the Pune sample experienced a sharper adverse impact than the Mumbai sample because they were more dependent on the market for their livelihood.
The Mumbai sample was organised in SHGs and they had collective group savings, bank savings and extensive social networks to fall back upon. The groups also often produced and sold by orders or for exhibitions and sponsored sales. They were all linked to banks and direct transfers and cheque payment systems well before 2016. They hardly used costlier microfinance loans. After demonetisation, as a group, they shifted to Paytm and bank transfers for their sales and during exhibitions. They were not as adversely hit. In open-ended questions and discussions, Mumbai respondents seemed to realise that they escaped significant damage only because they were very tiny producers, not exposed extensively to the market, moneylenders or microfinance companies and had been financially included progressively and well before 2016. The adverse impact of reduced sales and income was damaging for the self-employed in both models and has reduced their savings and current demand for credit.
For those dependent on wages in the tiny sector, delays in wages were common, as was reduction in savings, producing uncertainly and depressed expectations about the future. The analysis indicated the likelihood of rising bank non-performing assets emerging from tiny, small and medium enterprises and of the general economic slowdown. Evidence for the former has now emerged from other sources as well (Financial Express 2017). Similar distress is emerging in the MUDRA and small loan segment scheme (loans without collateral for commercial purposes for established tiny and small enterprises).
The Economic Survey, 2017 had also acknowledged that the relatively poor were the primary collateral damage, though the exercise was to fight black money. Moreover, these relatively poor are not a small number, they form the bulk of the informally employed in the cash economy. They were the subjects of newspaper reports on farmer distress, troops of migrant workers returning to their villages in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Odisha, and West Bengal due to the closure of micro and small enterprises in Tamil Nadu, Punjab, Karnataka and Kerala, and then the farmers’ agitations in June (Sethi and Mitra 2017). Many would have had to start from lower income levels again. It is likely that their unsubstantial savings did not grow. Their ability to get credit for business/productive purposes would have taken a hit. It is also likely that they would have had to raise more debt and possibly more debt from informal sources in the medium term. In the months following, there was a cutback in their demand expenditure as well. “Financial inclusion” needs a long-term, steady and planned pathway of employment. There do not seem to be any short cuts.
Note
1 The criteria in Maharashtra, India, are families with a total annual income of more than `15,000 and less than 1 lakh. None of the members in the family should have a four-wheeler mechanical vehicle (excluding taxi drivers). The family should not possess four hectares or more of irrigated land.
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Source : From the Web